



INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE

HALF YEARLY MARSEC SITUATION IN IFC AOI 2020

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FOREWORD

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) has recorded the **Maritime Security (MARSEC) Situation in the IFC's Area of Interest (AOI)** since Jan 2016, with data corresponding from Jan 2013. This document contains briefs covering separate maritime security categories that IFC monitors and reports on. All incidents were grouped into the following categories for 2020: Theft, Robbery And Piracy at Sea (TRAPS); Maritime Terrorism (MT); Maritime Incidents (MI); Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU); Contraband Smuggling (CS); and Irregular Human Migration (IHM). These briefs have been produced with IFC data collated from open sources and incorporate inputs from the International Liaison Officers (ILOs) deployed at the IFC.

This document aims to provide an update to the MARSEC situation in the IFC's AOI for each MARSEC threat category for Jan to Jun 2020 and highlight any observed changes in patterns or *modus operandi* when compared with preceding years.

It should be noted that all data and information in this document was obtained from open sources, and only constitute what was reported. It is not an exact representation of all incidents that have occurred at sea as incidents may go unreported to local or flag-state authorities. Any reference to the analysis made from this document should take into consideration the above-mentioned limitation. We hope you find this update useful in shaping and/or cueing your respective MARSEC operations accordingly.

Yours Sincerely,

<via email>

SLTC Gary Ow

Head Information Fusion Centre

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SECTION A: THEFT, ROBBERY AND PIRACY AT SEA (TRAPS) & MARITIME TERRORISM (MT)

1. Introduction. This section will provide an overview of the Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea and Maritime Terrorism (TRAPS-MT) incidents within the IFC's AOI from Jan to Jun 2020. **Figure 1** gives an overview of the IFC's AOI location of TRAPS-MT incidents recorded. The incidents are color-coded for profiling purposes and reflecting a total of six sub-categories following the legend shown in the map below.




Figure 1: Location of TRAPS-MT Incidents from Jan to Jun 2020

2. Definitions. The definitions of the specialised terms used in this segment are as follows:

a. Piracy. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

- b. Sea Robbery. Any illegal act of violence, detention, any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed with arms for private ends and directed against a ship or persons or property onboard such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; or any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
- c. Sea Theft. Any illegal act of stealing property from a vessel without any personal interaction with the crew or passengers, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or property onboard a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
- d. Hijacking-Kidnapping. Any illegal act of violence whereby perpetrators have boarded and taken control/detained a vessel and/or its crew against their will, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
- e. Attack. Any illegal act of violence whereby a clear attempt to cause harm to the vessel/crew by (a) discharging weapons against/towards a vessel/crew, (b) ramming/boarding the vessel or any other similar acts of violence have been made, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
- f. Attempted Actions. Any suspicious activity including but not limited to vessel(s); (1) closing on a steady bearing to hamper safe navigation, (2) having a very close CPA, (close approach or hull-to-hull contact) with boarding paraphernalia employed or visible, (3) weapons clearly seen on display as a show of force or threat against the vessel but have not yet been discharged against the merchant vessel and/or (4) unsuccessful attempt to rob or steal from vessel being boarded for illicit purposes.
- g. Suspicious Approach. Any act of vessel(s) approaching close proximity enough to warrant suspicion.
- h. Maritime Terrorism. This refers to the undertaking of any acts of terrorism within the maritime domain; involving vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, at coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities. Kidnapping for ransom claimed by a known terrorist group or terror group will also be placed in this category.

3. General Observation(s) in 2020. **Figure 2, 3, and 4** shows a total of 59 incidents that have occurred within the IFC's AOI from Jan to Jun 2020. The numbers are higher compared to the incidents recorded in 2019 (35) and 2018 (53). The 59 incidents reported in 2020 are as follows:

- a. 2 Maritime Terrorism related incidents; one Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR) and one Bombing incidents (3.39%)
- b. 1 Piracy/Hijacking-Kidnapping (1.69%);
- c. 3 Sea Robbery (5.08%);
- d. 37 Sea Thefts (62.71%);
- e. 15 Attempted Actions (25.42%);
- f. 1 Suspicious Approaches (1.69%).

4. Vessels Targeted. Tankers are the most targeted vessel type, with a total of 21 incidents (32.31%). Additionally, bulk carriers (24.62%), Tugs with Barges (7.69%) and government vessels (7.69%) were also observed to be significant targets. In 2019, bulk carriers were accounted for most of the incidents (27.27%), followed by tankers (21.21%) and tugs with barges (15.15%).




Figure 2: Number of TRAPS Incidents by Month in 2018, 2019 and 2020




Figure 3: Type of Incidents




Figure 4: Type of Vessels Attacked

5. TRAPS-MT Area of Major Concerns Profile(s) in 2020. For this report, the Area of Major Concerns will be referred to as **Hotspots**. The hotspots are identified and differentiated by (1) geographical location (2) type, characteristics, frequency and level of violence used by the perpetrators (3) date, day and time of occurrence (4) type of vessels attacked and (5) type of cargo and/or goods stolen or robbed.

6. For this half-yearly report, the hotspots were also determined based on the occurrence of at least three TRAPS incidents and the potentiality of TRAPS-MT threats within the areas identified. These areas have been listed from west to east with respect to the IFC's AOI, namely:

- a. Alang Anchorage.
- b. Kakinada Anchorage.
- c. Chattogram Port and Approaches.
- d. Belawan Port and Anchorage.
- e. Singapore Strait and Approaches.
- f. Sunda Strait and Approaches.
- g. Muara Berau Anchorage.
- h. Manila Anchorage.




Figure 5: Hotspots Relation - Number of Incidents and Level of Violence

7. **Figure 5** illustrated the hotspot in relation to the number of incidents and the level of violence observed. The level of violence is differentiated as follows:

- a. Low Violence – Incidents with no confrontation with the crew.
- b. Medium Violence – Incident involving the threatening of crew/use of knives or firearms by the perpetrators
- c. High Violence – Incidents involving the taking of hostages/injury to the crew by armed perpetrators.

8. The majority of incidents in the hotspots tend to involve a low level of violence, except for ‘Chattogram Port and Approaches’ and ‘Singapore Strait and Approaches’, with medium violence in some of the incidents observed (e.g. threatening of crew/use of knives by perpetrators). Most of the hotspot have less than five incidents, except for Manila Anchorage which recorded five incidents, as well as the Singapore Strait and Approaches, which recorded at least 10 incidents.

9. TRAPS Hotspots Key Observation(s) in 2020.




Figure 6: Incidents in Kakinada Anchorage

- a. Alang Anchorage, India. Three incidents were recorded in the Alang Anchorage area (**Figure 6**). In two of the incidents, perpetrators targeted crewless towed vessel for demolition, while the third incident involved an anchored Offshore Supply Vessel. Perpetrators were observed to target ship’s stores and operate in groups of four to five using dinghy boats during Periods

of Darkness (PoD), and/or in conditions with low visibility. In all cases, no confrontation and injury to the crew were reported. No incidents were recorded in this area in the same period of 2019 while the last incident recorded in this area occurred in Jan 2018.




Figure 7: Incidents in Kakinada Anchorage

b. Kakinada Anchorage, India. Three Sea Theft incidents were recorded in the Kakinada Anchorage area (**Figure 7**). All incidents occurred while the vessels were anchored and during PoD and/or in conditions with low visibility. Tanker and offshore support vessels were the targeted and perpetrators tended to steal ship's stores such as mooring ropes. No incidents were recorded in the same period in 2019 and 2018. No injury to the crew was reported in all cases in this area. The only incident recorded in this area last year (Sep 2019) was onboard an anchored tanker during PoD.




Figure 8: Incidents in Chattogram Port and Approaches

c. Chattogram Port and Approaches, Bangladesh. Four incidents (one Sea Robbery and three Sea Thefts) were recorded off Chattogram Port and the surrounding anchorage areas (**Figure 8**). Most of the incidents occurred while the vessels were anchored or berthed. Although one incident involved perpetrators armed with knives, there were no confrontation and injury to the crew reported. Tugs with barges were the most targeted vessels, and items targeted were typically rigging equipment, portable batteries, mooring ropes, and shackles. No incidents were recorded in this area in 2019 and 12 incidents were recorded in 2018, which mostly involved anchored vessels.



Figure 9: Incidents in Belawan Port and Anchorages

d. Belawan Port and Anchorage, Indonesia. Three incidents (two Sea Thefts and one Attempted Action) were recorded in Belawan Port and Anchorage area (**Figure 9**). All incidents occurred during PoD while the vessels were either anchored or berthed. Tankers were the most targeted vessels and the small items such as fire hose nozzles were stolen. In all cases, no confrontation and injury to the crew were reported. In the same period last year, two Sea Theft incidents recorded, both of which occurred onboard tankers.




Figure 10: Incidents in Singapore Strait and Approaches

e. Singapore Strait and Approaches. A total of 19 incidents (Nine Attempted Actions, seven Sea Thefts, two Sea Robberies, and one Suspicious Approach) were recorded between Jan to Jun 2020 (**Figure 10**) within this hotspot, which includes areas within the eastbound lane and westbound lane of the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), as well as the area north of Batam Island. The number of incidents was significantly higher than the 10 incidents recorded in the same period in 2019 and 2018. As compared to the same period in 2019, the trend of incidents in this area had shifted from the westbound TSS lane in the western approaches to the eastbound TSS lane off Karimun Island and northern Batam Island. Since Jan 2020, only one incident was recorded in the westbound TSS lane off Tg Piai, as compared to the eight incidents recorded in 2019. About 89.47% (17) of incidents occurred during PoD, and notably, most of the vessels were attacked while underway, except for three incidents onboard anchored vessels off Batam Island. The perpetrators' modus operandi remains the same, targeting vessels travelling at slow speeds and with low freeboard, such as tugs with barges, bulk carriers, and tankers. Most of the incidents occurred during PoDs, except for two incidents onboard tugs with barges during daylight. The Sea Theft incidents typically do not feature the use of weapons or confrontation with the crew, and the perpetrators typically targeted ship's properties such as scrap metals, machinery spares, and ship's equipment. No use of weapons was reported for the Sea Theft incidents. For the two Sea Robberies observed, the perpetrators used weapons such as knives and machetes and targeted vessels' equipment and spare parts. Further analysis of modus operandi of perpetrators against vessels in these waters was provided in the IFC Analyst Journal 1/20.




Figure 11: Incidents in Sunda Strait and Approaches

f. Sunda Strait and Approaches, Indonesia. In the Sunda Strait and Approaches (**Figure 11**), three incidents (two Sea Thefts and one Attempted Action) were reported. The number of incidents was slightly higher compared to the incidents that occurred in the same period in 2019 (two). All cases involved tankers, occurring during PoD while the vessels were anchored. The investigation by local authorities found that the perpetrators tended to target the machinery room for spares. Low-level of violence were observed, with no injury to the crew were reported for all incidents.




Figure 12: Incidents in Muara Berau Anchorage

g. Muara Berau Anchorage, Indonesia. Three incidents (two Sea Thefts and one Attempted Action) were recorded (**Figure 12**), while no incidents were recorded in 2019. All incidents occurred onboard anchored bulk carriers during PoD and/or in conditions with low visibility. Perpetrators stole and/or demonstrated an intent to steal ship's stores. No confrontation and injury to the crew were reported.




Figure 13: Incidents in the Manila Anchorage

h. Manila Anchorage, Philippines. Five incidents (four Sea Thefts and one Attempted Action) were recorded in the Manila Anchorage and surrounding areas (**Figure 13**). All incidents occurred during PoD, with perpetrators mostly targeting anchored Container Ships. The number of incidents is higher than 2019 (one) within the same period. In all incidents, small items such as fire hoses were reported stolen without any damage to the vessels. No injury to the crew and use of weapons were reported.




Figure 14: Other Areas with Similar TRAPS Incident Profile

- i. Area(s) - Similar TRAPS Incident Profile(s). **Figure 14** indicates the TRAPS incidents in areas with similar incident profiles. Based on the IFC's records, at least three areas were observed to have incident(s) with similar profiles. All the incidents occurred during PoD and/or in conditions with low visibility, and while the vessels were anchored or berthed. Perpetrators boarded the vessels from the forecastle deck and targeted the ship's Bosun Stores, targeting items such as rigging equipment and ropes. It is also worthwhile to note that the incidents in these areas involved a low level of violence. No injury to the crew was reported in all incidents.




Figure 15: Maritime Terrorism Incidents

10. MT Key Observation(s). Two MT incidents were recorded in Eastern - Sabah Sulu and Celebes Sea and off a small island-town in Alif Dhaalu Atoll, Maldives, as indicated in **Figure 15**. The first incident involves Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) claimed to be conducted by KFR Group (KFRG) with linkages to Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) off Tambisan, Sabah. Five fishermen were abducted and kept captive on the islands in the southern Philippines. The second incident involved a bombing attack claimed by The Soldiers of the Caliphate, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Maldivian police sources confirmed that the attack had been carried out using a simple improvised explosive device (IED), categorized as a retaliatory attack for investigations into drug trafficking and religious extremism. The attack damaged two small boats and five government vessels berthed in the harbour of Mahibandhoo, Alif Dhaalu Atoll. This is the first maritime incident in the area related to ISIS activity.

11. Key Event(s) from Jan to Jun 2020.

a. Attempted Actions

(1) 21 Jan 20 – Attempted Action off Kabil, Batam, Indonesia. An Attempted Action occurred onboard Indonesian Flagged tanker while anchored off Kabil, Batam, Indonesia, during PoD on 21 Jan 20. The vessel was boarded by four perpetrators armed with sharp weapons in Kabil waters, eastern Batam Island, Indonesia. The crew managed to fight robbers off which resulted in the capture of one perpetrator, while the other three fled overboard and one crew suffered face injury. The captured robber was handed over to Indonesian authority.

(2) 16 Mar 20 – Attempted Action at Singapore Strait and Approaches. Liberia flagged bulk carrier was boarded by three perpetrators while transiting off north of Pulau Nipa at 0500LT on 16 Mar 20. The ship's crew managed to lock the perpetrators in the engine room, and immediately reported to Singapore VTIS, which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators by the Indonesian Navy. Nothing was reported stolen and no injury was reported.

(3) 17 May 20 – Attempted Action at Tanjung Uban Anchorage, Indonesia. While a Singapore flagged tanker was anchored at Tanjung Uban Anchorage, Indonesia around 0400LT on 17 May 20, three perpetrators armed with knives boarded the vessel. When the alarm was raised, the perpetrators escaped leaving a small knife on deck. There was no injury to the crew and no loss of property. On a follow-up operation, four suspects were apprehended by the Indonesian Navy in different locations in Batam, Riau Islands.

b. Sea Theft

(1) 18 Jan 20 – Sea Theft at Singapore Strait and Approaches. While a Singapore registered tug was underway with barge in tow along the eastbound TSS lane in Singapore Strait around 1100LT on 18 Jan 20, an unknown number of perpetrators boarded the barge. Reportedly there were two sampans alongside the barge but subsequently peeled off. However, around 1600LT on the same day, the same barge was boarded by seven perpetrators in the eastbound TSS lane. Two Singapore Police Coast Guard (PCG) craft were dispatched to intercept. However, the perpetrators fled on their sampans upon seeing the PCG crafts. Upon further investigations, Indonesian Sea Security Task Group (GUSKAMLA) Batam Naval Base successfully uncovered scrap iron demolition activities carried out by boats at Tanjung Uma jetty near Batu Ampar. Further investigation uncovered that the scrap metal was obtained from the sea via small wooden boats, which are sold to collectors in Batu Ampar.

(2) 25 Jan 20 – Sea Theft at Manila Anchorage, Philippines. While anchored South Quarantine Anchorage, Manila, Philippines, around 0400LT on 25 Jan 20, the duty watch onboard Portugal flagged container vessel sighted one perpetrator onboard, who jumped overboard and swam towards a small boat which subsequently fled from the area. Upon inspection and check of the ship's inventory, two broken padlocks and a lighter with attached pin light (turned on) (believed to be the perpetrator's) were found. The vessel reported that one jet chisel machine, two cans of paint, one forward bell, three immersion suits, two breathing apparatus cylinders, one breathing apparatus, and one chemical suit were missing.

(3) 29 Jan 20 – Sea Theft at Manila Anchorage, Philippines. While anchored in Manila South Anchorage, Philippines, Hong Kong flagged

container vessel noticed several perpetrators boarding the vessel around 0300LT on 29 Jan 20. Two of the storage rooms were subsequently discovered to have been broken into. The vessel reported that one set of firefighting breathing devices, two sets of immersion and thermal protective suits, 28 casks of paints, 34 pieces of firehose handguns, and 34 pieces of fire hydrant covers were stolen. No confrontation and injury to the crew.

(4) 7 Feb 20 – Sea Theft at Singapore Strait and Approaches. While Malaysia flagged tug and barge were underway Off Karimun Besar Island, Indonesia, around 1200LT on 7 Feb 20, along the eastbound lane of Singapore Strait bound to Kuching, Malaysia, four unknown small wooden boats approached to Barge and eight unknown personnel have boarded and stole steel construction materials that the barge was carrying.

(5) 6 Mar 20 – Sea Theft at Chittagong Anchorage, Bangladesh. Perpetrators boarded Singapore flagged barge towed by a Indonesia-registered tug while it was anchored at Chittagong Anchorage, Bangladesh, around 1430LT on 6 Mar 20. The perpetrators stole the crane data-logger display and cut the safety system wiring. Portable batteries for types of machinery (eg crane, generators, and hydraulic power pack), along with diesel and hydraulic oil were stolen as well. The crew from the tug contacted a passing Coast Guard vessel via VHF, which subsequently apprehended the perpetrators.

(6) 25 Mar 20 – Sea Theft at Alang Anchorage, India. While a Panama flagged barge towed by tug was underway at Alang Anchorage, India, at 2000LT on 25 Mar 20, four perpetrators boarded the Barge from a small boat. The Master of the tug spotted the perpetrators and the alarm was raised, resulting in the perpetrators escaping. The local Vessel Traffic Information Service (VTIS) was informed, who reported the incident to the Indian Coast Guard. Local marine Police were then requested to send their vessels for investigation. It has been confirmed that the perpetrators were arrested, and the stolen items recovered.

(7) 11 Apr 20 – Sea Theft off Tanjung Kelesa, Johor, Malaysia. A Sea Theft occurred onboard a Marshall Island flagged tanker while anchored off Tanjung Kelesa, Johor, Malaysia, around 1030LT on 11 Apr 20. The Master discovered a breathing apparatus air charging compressor and a M4 Weldon pump was missing. The crew did not see perpetrators boarding but suspected the robbers boarded the vessel during PoD and stole the said equipment.

(8) 16 Apr 20 – Sea Theft off Anambas Island, Indonesia. A Sea Theft incident was discovered onboard a Belgium flagged Oil tanker while it was underway at 0800LT on 16 Apr 20. The Master of the

VLCC discovered a breathing apparatus air compressor unit and various spare parts were stolen. The crew did not witness the theft incident nor sighted the perpetrators onboard. It was believed that the incident took place during PoD between 15 Apr 20 and 16 Apr 20.

(9) 16 Apr 20 – Sea Theft at Singapore Strait and Approaches. A Sea Theft incident occurred onboard a Marshall Island flagged bulk carrier while it was transiting along the eastbound TSS lane in Singapore Strait around 0100LT on 16 Apr 20. The Master reported that the vessel was boarded by three unknown personnel. A search was conducted and the crew reported that the three personnel had disembarked, with engine parts stolen. All crew were accounted for, no injuries were reported, and no assistance was required.

(10) 18 Apr 20 – Sea Theft at Alang Anchorage, India. While a Liberia flagged tanker towed by tug was anchored at Alang Anchorage, India, awaiting demolition around midnight on 18 Apr 20, the vessel was boarded by some perpetrators from a dinghy boat. Some ship properties were reportedly stolen. The Master of the tug reported the incident to VTS Khambhat, who relayed the message to the Indian Coast Guard. This is the third event at Alang Anchorage since Jan 2020 and the second incident occurred onboard uncrewed vessels being towed for dismantling.

(11) 21 Apr 20 – Sea Theft at Vung Tau Anchorage, Vietnam. While anchored at Vung Tau Anchorage, Vietnam, around 0145LT on 21 Apr 20, Bermuda flagged tanker was boarded by four robbers in a wooden boat. The Duty watchman on routine rounds noticed the robbers and raised the ship's alarm. The perpetrators subsequently escaped with stolen ship's stores. The crew mustered and a search was carried out. The incident was reported to port control authorities. The last recorded incident that happened in this area was in 2016.

(12) 15 May 20 – Sea Theft at Singapore Strait and Approaches. A Sea Theft occurred onboard a Comoros flagged tug while it was underway south of Tanjung Piai along the westbound TSS lane in Singapore Strait around 1850LT on 15 May 20. The Master sighted two perpetrators fleeing on a sampan and subsequently discovered some berthing ropes missing. This is the first incident in the westbound TSS lane in Singapore Strait in 2020.

(13) 25 May 20 – Sea Theft off South Sumatra, Indonesia. A Sea Theft occurred onboard a yacht off South Sumatra, Indonesia, at approximately midnight on 24 May 20. The skipper sent distress signals after discovering the loss of ship stores and equipment from the vessel. Upon subsequent investigations, authorities were able to secure the stolen items such as EPIRB, navigation equipment, communication radios, cell phones, cooking utensils, ship's steering,

boat engine starters, passports, and cash, but the suspected perpetrators managed to escape.

(14) 29 May 20 – Sea Theft off Malwan, Maharashtra, India. A Sea Theft incident occurred onboard fishing vessel off Malwan, Maharashtra, India, around 0800LT on 29 May 20. A gang of 16 fishermen belonging to the local fishing community from Malwan, Maharashtra, boarded the fishing trawler and stole the trawler's equipment and fish catch. A complaint was subsequently lodged, resulting in the arrest of the said gang and the successful recovery of all stolen items. Investigation shows the incident is an outcome of two fishing boats' crew rivalry, which occurred within coastal fishing areas/zones. The incident occurred approximately 20nm from Goa, along the coast of India.

(15) 16 Jun - Sea Theft at Ko Sichang Anchorage, Thailand. A Sea Theft occurred onboard Bahamas flagged bulk carrier it was anchored at Ko Sichang Anchorage, Thailand, around 1115LT on 16 Jun 20. The perpetrators had boarded the vessel during cargo operations, broke into the aft store and stole ship's equipment. The break-in was only noticed by the crew during routine operations and was subsequently reported to the ship's agent and PFSO. It was the first incident since 2015 at this location.

c. Sea Robbery:

(1) 7 Feb - Sea Robbery off Dhalgata, Bangladesh. A Sea Robbery incident occurred onboard a Singapore flagged tug while it was anchored off Dhalgata, Bangladesh, around 1920LT on 07 Feb 20. Duty personnel sighted two suspicious fishing boats approaching the tug, with several perpetrators armed with knives subsequently boarding. The general alarm triggered causes the perpetrators to escape. The crew searched and found some mooring ropes and shackles stolen. The crew were not injured and there was no damage reported.

(2) 9 Feb 20 – Sea Robbery at the Eastbound TSS Lane in Singapore Strait. While a Marshall Island flagged bulk carrier was underway heading easterly along the Singapore Strait around 0220LT on 9 Feb 20, the Master broadcasted in MMS CH 16 that an unknown number of personnel with knives were sighted onboard the vessel. At 0722LT, Singapore PCG completed the search onboard the vessel and found no unauthorised persons onboard. During the investigation, the Master reported that five crews were working inside the engine room and spotted six unknown people, one of them holding a knife. One of the crew was tied up but managed to free himself later and saw the perpetrators leaving with two bags of spare parts. The company CSO updated that the items stolen were 20 pieces of circular brakes, 130 metres of cables, and 25 pieces of magnetic contactors.

(3) 9 May 20 – Sea Robbery at the Eastbound TSS Lane in Singapore Strait. A Liberia Island flagged bulk carrier reported to Singapore VTIS that she was boarded by five armed perpetrators while underway along the eastbound TSS lane in the Singapore Strait at 1145LT on 09 May 20. The Master reported that one of the ship crew was injured but required no assistance. A search was conducted, and no perpetrators was found. Two breathing apparatus and one cell phone were reported stolen. The vessel continued her journey to the next port of call.

d. Kidnap-Hijack/Piracy/Attack:

(1) 4 May 20 – Piracy at Southern Approach to the South China Sea. While anchored at the northeast of Pulau Bintan, Indonesia around 0350LT on 4 May 20, a Danish flagged chemical was boarded by four armed perpetrators with long knives. Duty personnel informed the bridge on the sighting of the perpetrators and the alarm was raised immediately. Upon sounding the alarm, the four perpetrators escaped in a 6-meter wooden boat with two other perpetrators on the boat. The crew mustered and carry out a search, no other perpetrator was found. One walkie talkie was taken away from the Duty personnel when he encountered the perpetrators. All crew were reported safe.

e. Maritime Terrorism:

(1) 16 Jan 20 – Hijacking-Kidnapping off Tambisan, Malaysia. Five Indonesian fishermen were abducted from the eastern edge of Sabah waters off Tambisan, Lahad Datu, by kidnap-for-ransom groups linked to the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from the southern Philippines. Six gunmen dressed in black overalls took the five of eight fishermen from their Sabah-registered trawler in waters between Pulau Tambisan and Kuala Meruap in Lahad Datu, close to the Philippine sea-border on Thursday (16 Jan) around 2000LT. All fishermen are Indonesians working for a Sandakan-based fishing company.

(2) 15 Apr – Bombing Off Mahibandhoo, Alif Dhaalu Atoll, Maldives. Maldives Police Service revealed that seven vessels were severely damaged in a fire that broke out in the harbour of Mahibandhoo, Alif Dhaalu Atoll around 0522LT on 15 Apr 20. Although authorities confirmed that no individuals were injured in the incident, all the vessels (2 small boats and 5 government vessels) were burnt beyond use. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the bombing. ISIS's propaganda wing claimed fighters had destroyed boats belonged to the "Apostate Maldivian Government and its loyalists" and they were hit with "incendiary bombs." Maldives Police sources confirmed that the attack was carried out using a simple improvised explosive device. Police had earlier characterised the

bombing as “a retaliatory attack for recent investigations into drug trafficking and religious extremism”.

SECTION C: MARITIME INCIDENTS (MI)

1. Introduction. This segment aims to provide readers with a better understanding of the location and types of maritime incidents occurring within the IFC AOI. From Jan to Jun 2020, 397 maritime incidents were reported, a 22.16% (88) decrease compared to the same timeframe in 2019, and a 16.37% (65) increase compared to the same period in 2018. The following analysis will look at the data recorded in the first half of 2020 and identify possible trends within the IFC's AOI. The following five categories of maritime incidents will be examined: (1) Sunk/Capsized, (2) Collision, (3) Grounding, (4) Vessel Detained, and (5) Violent Confrontation.

2. Definitions. The definitions of the specialised terms used in this segment are as follows:

- a. Maritime Incident. Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not pertain to Theft Robbery and Piracy at Sea (TRAPS) & Maritime Terrorism (MT), Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUU), Irregular Human Migration (IHM), Contraband Smuggling (CS) and Other. Incidents due to weather may appear in this category;
- b. Collision. Any incident involving physical impact between two or more vessels, or a vessel and any other floating or still object;
- c. Grounding. An incident involving an impact between the bottom of a vessel's hull and the seabed or coastline, resulting in the vessel being unable to carry on or proceed with her journey without assistance;
- d. Sunk/Capsized. An incident which involves or results in a vessel being overturned or submerged in the water completely (excluding submarines);
- e. Vessel Detained. An incident arising from vessels engaging in activities that are not compliant to the rules and regulations which apply in a specific area, or activities that are carried out without official permission from the authorities over the area;
- f. Violent Confrontation. Any hostile situation that involves any form of weapons or physical violence;
- g. Other Incidents. Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not pertain to other previously defined incident categories i.e. fire, gas leak, man overboard (MOB), MEDEVAC, missing vessel, etc.;
- h. Registered Vessel. A vessel registered with an IMO number.




Figure 15: Number of Maritime Incidents by Month in 2018, 2019 and 2020




Figure 16: The distribution of Maritime Incidents according to the type of incident

3. Overview of Jan to Jun 20. A total of 397 maritime incidents were reported, 22% lower compared to the same period in 2019, and a 16% increase compared to the same period in 2018 (**Figure 15**). The rise and fall of maritime incidents can mainly be attributed to the changes in weather conditions within the IFC's AOI. It is worth noting that of all the incidents, 547 vessels were involved, 189 (35%) of which were registered vessels while 358 (65%) were unregistered. **Figure 16** shows the breakdown of maritime incidents according to categories. Several recorded incidents (**Figure 15**) and type of recorded maritime incidents (**Figure 16**) may not be the same as the IFC made some changes to its incident categorisation since Jan 2020 (A single reported incident might have been categorised into two or three separate incidents). From the type of incidents (397) recorded in the first half of 2020, vessels sinking or capsizing, vessels being detained, mechanical failures, medical evacuations, collisions, groundings, missing vessels, fire-explosions, allisions, and man-overboard incidents account for most of the maritime incidents within the IFC's AOI.




Figure 17: Number of maritime incidents recorded from Jan to Jun 2020 by types of vessels.

4. Types of Vessels. The main type of vessels involved in maritime incidents are fishing vessels (29.3%). Majority of the other vessels consists of small boats, civilian landing craft tanks, dredgers, supply ship, miscellaneous ship, yachts, speed boats, etc. (26.3%), container/cargo ships (16.6%), passenger vessels (9%), tankers (7.9%), bulk carriers (5.1%), tugs and/or barges (3.1%), government vessels (2.4%) and unknown vessels (0.4%). **Figure 17** shows the distribution of maritime incidents according to the type of vessels involved. The following sections will provide a more detailed breakdown of maritime incidents and analysis of potential trends and patterns IFC has identified.




Figure 18: Number of SAR and MEDEVAC incidents recorded from Jan to Jun 2020




Figure 19: Number of persons rescued, missing, or dead from Jan to Jun 2020.

5. SAR Operations & MI Human Cost. This section summarises the number of Search and Rescue (SAR) and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations carried out between Jan to Jun 2020, as well as statistics on people rescued, dead, and missing.

a. SAR Operations. 231 SAR were recorded for first half of year 2020 which is 34% lower compared to the same period in 2019 and a 7% increase compared to the same period in 2018. A total of 45 MEDEVAC operations recorded from January to June 2020 which is increase compared to the same period in 2019 (44) and 2018 (25). A total of 2613 people were rescued. Likewise, 244 people are missing, and 95 people are dead for the first half of year 2020 (**Figures 18 and 19**). Total number of dead 95 is significantly lower compared to the same period in 2019 (166) and 2018 (144).




Figure 20: Overall breakdown of dead/missing persons from Jan to Jun 2020.

b. Dead and Missing Persons. While 2613 have been rescued during this period, a total of 339 persons were either dead or missing at sea. 46 (14%) were seafarers, including ship's crew and sailors, 105 (31%) were fishermen and the remaining 188 (55%) are comprised of persons that do not earn their livelihood out at seas, such as tourists, migrants, and ship passengers (**Figure 20**). 46 recorded seafarers dead/missing is lower than compared to the same period in 2019 (107) and in 2018 (98). It can be noted that most deaths and cases of missing persons have been largely due to sunk or capsized vessels, which were caused mainly by bad weather and rough seas.




Figure 21: Monthly breakdown of dead/missing persons from Jan to Jun 2020.

c. **Figure 21** shows the breakdown of missing or dead persons per month. This translates to an average of 57 deaths/ missing per month or 13 deaths/ missing per week.

6. Analysis of incidents from Jan to Jun 2020




Figure 22: Location of collision incidents in the IFC's AOI

a. Collisions. There were 40 collision incidents recorded in the IFC's AOI which is 42% lower compared to the same period in 2019 and a 40% decrease compared to the same period in 2018. Container/ cargo ships (26%), fishing vessels (20%), government vessels (7%), tankers (7%), passenger vessels (4%), tug and/or barge (4%) and bulk carriers (4%), as well as other vessels (25%), consisting of vessels such as small boats, cable laying vessels, pilot vessels, speed boats and dredgers, accounted for the majority of vessels involved in collisions. **Figure 22** shows the location of collision incidents between Jan to Jun 2020. Most of the government vessels involved in the collision were due to the violent confrontation between fishing vessels or smuggling vessels and government vessels. The incidents mentioned occurred mainly off the coasts of Japan (23%), Indonesia (15%), China (10%), India (10%), Vietnam (8%), and Philippines (8%). In addition, most of the causes of collision incidents reported were mainly due to unknown causes (73%), while some cases were reported to be due to bad weather (7%) and human error (5%). It is worth noting that of the 92 vessels were involved in the 40 collisions recorded, 44 (48%) of which were registered vessels while 48 (52%) were unregistered. In the first half year of 2020, the collision happened in off the coast of Indonesia is higher than compared to the same period in 2019 and 2018.




Figure 23: Location of Vessel Grounding Incidents in the IFC's AOI

b. Vessel Groundings. The IFC recorded a total of 28 grounding incidents within the AOI (**Figure 23**). Container/cargo ships (43%), tankers (13%), bulk carriers (13%), passenger vessels (10%), fishing vessels (10%), small boats (7%) and tug and/or barges (3%) accounted for the grounding incidents recorded. It is also worth noting that the majority of the grounding incidents occurred in the waters of the Philippines (43%), Indonesia (18%), Bangladesh (11%) and Japan (7%). Based on the statistics of the incidents recorded, bad weather (30%) and engine failure (10%) were the main causes of grounding, although many incidents (40%) were due to unknown causes. Moreover, the geography of the two archipelagic nations (Indonesia and Philippines) that have large bodies of water surrounded by many islands increases the risk of grounding when vessels transit very closely to these islands. Other factors contributing to grounding incidents include anchor dragging, strong wind & currents, low tide, as well as rough seas. Of the vessels involved, 21 (70%) are registered vessels which is 57% lower compared to the same period in 2019 and 2018.



Figure 24: Location of Sinking and Capsizing incidents in the IFC's AOI

c. Vessels Sunk or Capsized. 102 vessels were involved in the 98 sinking and capsizing incidents recorded. 18 (18%) of these are registered vessels which is lower compared to the same period in 2019 with 8 registered vessels involved and a significantly lower to the same period in 2018 with 67 registered vessels involved. Fishing vessels (38.2%), small boats and speed boats (33.3%), container/ cargo ships (15.7%), tug and/or barges (4.9%) and passenger vessel (4.9%) accounted for the vessels sunk or capsized. Most of the sinking/capsizing incidents occurred in the Philippines (32%), Indonesia (18.4%), India (8.2%), Malaysia (8.2%), and China (6.1%). Most of sinking and capsizing were due to bad weather (41.1%), water ingress (8.4%), and engine failure (7.5%), while many these incidents were due to unknown causes (28%). Furthermore, the countries mentioned above are mostly sea-going nations that accommodate and deploy large volumes of ships for commerce and transportation. **Figure 24** shows the locations of the sinking and capsizing incidents.




Figure 25: Location of the incident involving vessels detainment in the IFC's AOI

d. Detained Vessels. 67 recorded incidents involved vessels that were detained due to engagement in illegal activities. Small boats and dredgers (37.5%), fishing vessels (27.1%), tankers (17.7%), container/cargo ships (5.2%), bulk carriers (5.2%), passenger vessels (4.2%) and tugs and/or barges (3.1%). It is also worth noting that most of the detained cases occurred in the waters of Philippines (40%), Malaysia (30%), and Indonesia (9%). Based on records, the reasons why the vessels were detained are as follows: Unauthorised activities which includes illegal ship-to-ship (STS) transfer, sand dredging, suspected of being UN sanctioned, maritime safety violation, insufficient manning and not-carrying flag (39%), unauthorized entry (22%), invalid documentation (19%), and unauthorized anchoring (16%). Finally, it can be noted that 96 vessels were involved in these incidents, of which 31 (32%) are registered and 65 (68%) are not registered. **Figure 25** shows the location of the incidents that were recorded by the IFC.



Figure 26: Location of incidents of violent confrontations in the IFC's AOI

e. Violent Confrontation. There were 8 cases of violent confrontations within the IFC's AOI (as indicated in **Figure 26**). A total of 37 vessels were involved in these incidents, whereby most of the violent confrontations involved fishing vessels (35%) and speed boats (27%) against government vessels (19%) in disputed fishing grounds or whenever they are fishing illegally and smuggling. Although some of the causes of the incidents are unknown (25%), most can be attributed to disputes over fishing rights (25%), illegal fishing (13%), alcohol intoxication (13%), and ramming (13%). All of 8 incidents happened in 8 different countries or regions: Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Paracel islands, and Singapore Strait.

7. Key Incidents from Jan to Jun 2020.

a. January

(1) On 5 Jan 20, eight Chinese seamen from Cameroon-flagged general cargo ship as well as one Chinese seaman from another ship owned by the same company, were caught in Taichung for illegal entry after they left their ships docked at Taichung Port. They claimed that they wanted to seek help after having not received wages from the Hong Kong shipowner since Aug 2020.

(2) On 15 Jan 20, Mongolia-flagged cargo ship was abandoned near Changhua County coast (24 08N 120 20E), Taiwan Strait, after

the vessel listed to the port side. The ship had 7 crew members who abandoned ship and were rescued by helicopter.

(3) On 15 Jan 20, a collision involving a China-flagged tanker and a Malaysia-flagged container ship occurred in western Singapore Strait, East of Karimunbesar Island. This incident occurred due to attempted avoidance of small fishing vessels in the vicinity. The crew of both vessels were reported safe.

b. February

(1) On 3 Feb 20, China-flagged tanker was detained by India on suspicion of carrying some "essential" parts for missile launchers in Gujarat, India. The autoclave was mis-declared as an industrial dryer. On 20 Feb, the ship was released and proceeded to a Pakistani port after the autoclave was seized.

(2) On 11 Feb 20, the sinking/capsizing of a trawler was reported in the sea off St. Martin's Island, Bangladesh, resulting in 21 deaths and 50 missing.

(3) On 23 Feb 20, a Panama-flagged bulk carrier was detained by the Philippine Coast Guard for allegedly, tampering with AIS data and records, to avoid 14-day quarantine on arrival from Chinese port.

(4) On 23 Feb 20, a collision occurred between a fishing vessel and general cargo ship off Aomori, Japan. General Cargo Ship capsized following the collision. 13 crew were missing, marking the first fatal collision within the IFC AOI for 2020.

c. March

(1) On 4 Mar 20, an explosion occurred onboard a fishing vessel carrying three South Korean and five Vietnamese fishermen near Jeju island, ROK, resulting in six fishermen going missing. Two were subsequently rescued.

(2) On 10 Mar 20, a violent confrontation followed by a collision incident occurred between a fishing vessel and four small boats near Vellapallam, India, resulting in four missing. Seven were rescued.

(3) On 30 Mar 20, a fishing vessel collided with a military ship in the East China Sea, resulting in the damage of the military vessel (the last collision involving a warship was on 31 July 2019, along the Taiwan Strait).

d. April

(1) On 2 Apr 20, some passengers onboard a passenger boat with 60 people onboard were washed overboard due to bad weather

conditions off Solomon Islands, which caused the death of seven passengers and 20 missing (Cyclone Harold).

(2) On 2 Apr 20, a violent confrontation followed a collision between Chinese government vessels and Vietnam fishing vessels, near the disputed Paracel Islands, South China Sea. The eight crew members of the fishing boat were "captured and detained". Fishermen onboard two other Vietnamese fishing vessels who attempted to rescue the fishermen were detained as well.

(3) On 7 Apr 20, a small boat sunk/capsized after it grounded in the sea off St. Martin's Island, Bangladesh resulting in 15 deaths and 40 missing.

e. May

(1) On 11 May 20, Iran flagged container ship and Indonesia Flagged bulk carrier were both grounded in the Singapore Strait. Singapore POCC. The bulk carrier refloated on the same day and was taken to nearby Batam Anchorage while the container ship remained aground having sustained damages to both sides of the hull.

(2) An attempted action of TRAPS incident was reported by CSO of company to have occurred off Tanjung Laboh, Johor, Malaysia on 18 May. IFC has verified that this was actually a fishing net entanglement between Accommodation Work Barge (AWB) 4 and fishing net laid by a local fishing boat and its eventual dragging. Two fishing boats flashed their lights to the Tugboat which was on the process of towing the AWB. The tugboat eventually slowed down, allowing the fishermen to recover the fishing boats.

(3) On 20 May 20, 36 fishing vessels drifted after they were caught in a strong current due to Cyclone Amphan in the seas off Sri Lanka. On 23 May 20, the fishing ships were provided fuel and supplies from SLNS and were escorted towards Sri Lanka. This is the first cyclone in 2020 in Bay of Bengal.

f. June

(1) On 5 Jun 20, the two Indonesian citizens escaped by jumping into the sea in the waters north of Karimun, Riau Islands, because they could not stand the torture experienced while working on a Chinese Fishing Vessel. On 6 Jun 20, both were rescued by local fishermen. A labour sending agent had reportedly deceived them.

(2) On 10 Jun 20, a violent confrontation followed by a collision and sunk-capsized incident occurred between Chinese fishing vessels and Vietnam fishing vessels, near the Lincoln Island, Paracel Islands. This is the second confrontation between Chinese and

Vietnamese near the Paracel Islands (the last incident happened on 2 April 20).

(3) On 15 Jun 20, an explosion occurred onboard seven ocean-going fishing vessels at Yanpu Fishing Port, Pingtung County, southwest Taiwan.

SECTION C: ILLEGAL, UNREGULATED AND UNREPORTED (IUU) FISHING

1. Introduction. This segment looks at Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing incidents that have occurred within the IFC's AOI from Jan to Jun 2020. IUU fishing incidents refers to Fishing Vessels that have flouted the rules of legal conservation and management measures put into place by the respective authorities.
2. Definitions. Many references to IUU fishing fail to differentiate clearly between the three forms of fishing offenses. And the term of illegal fishing is often used incorrectly as shorthand. Hence for this report, The IFC has adopted the definition provided in the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's International Plans of Action. The definitions of the specialised terms as follows:
 - a. Illegal Fishing. Fishing activities conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, in contravention of national laws, international obligations or those relevant to a regional fisheries management organization.
 - b. Unreported Fishing. Fishing activities which have either been unreported or misreported to the relevant national authority or fisheries management organization whose laws have been contravened.
 - c. Unregulated Fishing. Fishing activities conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a state not party to the regional fisheries management organization, in a manner that is inconsistent with state responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law or conservation and management measures of that organization.
 - d. Illegal Local Practices. The conducted IUU fishing by national vessels, or foreign vessels which have a license to fish, in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, in contravention of its laws and regulations.
 - e. Poaching by Foreign Vessel. The conducted IUU fishing by foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, without the permission of that state, or in contravention of its laws and regulations.
 - f. Illegal International Practices. The conducted IUU fishing by vessels (declared as an IUU vessel by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and other official organizations) in contravention of regional regulations or international laws and regulations.




Figure 27: Number of IUU Incidents by month from Jan 2018 to Jun 2020




Figure 27: IUU Incidents according to Country

3. General Overview. 234 IUU Fishing incidents were reported between Jan to Jun 2020, an increase (36%) from the 172 incidents in 2018, and a decrease (20.9%) from the 296 incidents recorded in the same period. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in China and regional countries could have impacted the statistics in 2020, contributing to the fall in numbers recorded in comparison to 2019. Of note, most incidents occurred in the waters of the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. It is also observed that most of the incidents occurring in the waters of Thailand, Malaysia, and

Indonesia were poaching, while the main causes of IUU in Sri Lanka and the Philippines were Illegal Local Practices. **Figure 27** indicates the area of IUU incidents by country.




Figure 28: Number of Poaching Incidents by Foreign Vessels According to the Vessels' Registered Country

4. Poaching. Poaching by foreign vessels remains a major concern for regional countries. Vietnamese fishing vessels remain the largest group that conducts IUU fishing in foreign countries' waters, especially in Jun 2020. (**Figure 28**). However, Vietnamese authorities have implemented multiple measures involving various ministries, sectors, and provinces to combat IUU fishing. Some of these measures include heavy financial penalties as well as legal actions. Also, several coastal provinces have implemented additional regulations derived from the national law and policies. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Royal Thai Navy, and Indonesian Navy have continued carrying out enforcement tasks in order to combat IUU fishing in their waters, which is likely the reason for the larger numbers of apprehension of foreign Fishing Vessels observed. Many of the foreign vessels involving in IUU fishing in Malaysia's waters from mid-Mar to mid-Jun were recorded and turned away during the COVID-19 pandemic by Malaysian government vessels enforcing COVID-19 measures.




Figure 29: Number of IUU incidents Attributed to Local Vessels

5. Illegal Local Practices. The pro-activeness of Philippines and Sri Lankan maritime authorities in combating IUU fishing resulted in the highest number of IUU fishing cases being reported in the two countries. Illegal Local Practices are still the main concern for several countries in this region. There was also one incident involving Illegal Practices by a Licensed Foreign Vessel in ROK waters.

SECTION D: CONTRABAND SMUGGLING (CS)

1. Introduction. This segment of the brief is on Contraband Smuggling. The nomenclature of the category has been changed from the erstwhile Contraband Trafficking in this reporting period, but the definition remains unchanged. This was done to ensure commonality with other regional reporting centres to ease understanding for our customers.
2. General Comments. Contraband Smuggling is a lucrative business that commands significant revenue through the transfer of illegal goods, involving organised syndicates at the transnational level and individuals at the domestic level. The types of contraband and methods employed depend on individual countries and areas. Motivations can be purely criminal in intent involving drugs, weapons and the organised sale of counterfeit or black-market items, to what may be perceived lower level “harmless” or “victimless” crime to conduct smuggling by opportunity to avoid tariffs or taxes or to save cost. In all cases, smuggling is a concern for law enforcement as it highlights porous maritime borders, leads to a loss in revenue that might otherwise be used to help fund future maritime security initiatives, or in the case of lower-level smuggling, it could act as a gateway to repeat-offending or increasing the stakes leading to more serious items being smuggled.




Figure 30: Number of CS Incidents by Month in 2018, 2019 and 2020




Figure 31: Locations of Contraband Incidents (Jan – Jun 2020)




Figure 32: Types of Contraband Smuggling Incidents

3. Definitions. The definitions of the specialised terms used in this segment are as follows:

- a. Drugs Smuggling. When the smuggled goods are substances with a physiological effect on the body
- b. Fuel Smuggling. When the smuggled goods are fuel products;

- c. Domestic Products Smuggling. When the smuggled goods are either common household products or manufactured items;
 - d. Wildlife Smuggling. When the smuggled goods are live animals or animal parts listed under CITES;
 - e. Weapons Smuggling. When the goods smuggled are designed for inflicting bodily harm or any form of damage;
 - f. Tobacco Smuggling. When the smuggled goods are a product of the tobacco plant (last year this was simply Cigarettes but has now been expanded);
 - g. Others. When the smuggled goods are anything outside of the above categories
4. Overview of Jan to Jun 20. The first half of 2020 recorded a total of 135 incidents (**Figure 30**) of Contraband Smuggling. This is a marked decrease as compared to 2019 (208 incidents) and is lower than incidents recorded in 2018 (156 incidents). The first four months of the year saw lower number of incidents as compared to the previous year. The dip in numbers may partly also be attributed to the lockdowns and restrictions in the maritime domain due to COVID-19 measures. The absence of legitimate sea users to hide amongst may have reduced opportunities for smugglers to conduct their illicit activities. It is also possible that law enforcement and media were diverted from the incidents in view of the emerging health challenges of COVID-19. The majority of contraband smuggling cases involved drugs, tobacco, and domestic products, with Methamphetamine, Cannabis, and heroin accounting for the majority of the drug smuggling incidents. This is a cause for concern, especially as drug movements not only create significant social and economic problems in the region, but also because there is the distinct possibility of a nexus to criminal and terrorism funding. Drugs, Tobacco, and Domestic Products were the top three categories, followed by fuel, other natural resources, and Wildlife smuggling.
5. Areas of Contraband Seizures. **Figure 30** shows the concentrations of Contraband Smuggling incidents across the IFC AOI. The IFC's data set for contraband smuggling is predominantly derived from open source news articles and information from partner agencies. Some of the challenges with respect to the data set include the inability to access information from all agencies, incidents reported locally to the press but not considered newsworthy, and all cases which were not detected. The incidents we have reported that are most concentrated in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
- a. Reporting. Differences in reporting and an overall lack in understanding the full regional picture mean the data set is subject to several biases:

(1) Sri Lanka is active in reporting many incidents online, so we see a high number of incidents there, as is Malaysia.

(2) The Philippines Coast Guard and Navy are also very proactive in passing non-published incidents directly from their respective OPCENS.

(3) As the IFC sees more cooperation with law enforcement agencies, we will likely see more incidents. This would not mean that the actual levels of smuggling have changed, but rather that we are gaining a better understanding of the real numbers. While Contraband Smuggling activities may appear concentrated in certain areas, this could just be an indicator of greater reporting and freer information sharing.

b. Activity. Trends in activities can be seen in several areas:

(1) The Sri Lankan Navy has made multiple interceptions of significant drug quantities in the high seas, at extended ranges from the shore. The drug traffickers use dhows originating predominantly from Pakistan and Iran to transfer drugs to smaller vessels at sea. From media reports, interrogation of detained suspects and close cooperation with UNODC was instrumental in the apprehensions.

(2) Movement between Sri Lanka and India is likely to exist due to proximity and different markets. Authorities are proactive in the region and make arrests.

(3) Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have complex maritime borders and have cultures that depend on the sea for transport in general so many smuggling incidents can occur due to challenges with the volume of legitimate traffic. Authorities are active in the region to prevent other TRAPS and MT incidents and so this presence likely helps to prevent some smuggling.

(4) We see increasing reporting about attempts to move items between mainland China and Hong Kong, especially with electronics and luxury items. This year has witnessed elevated numbers of frozen meat seizures in Hong Kong, destined for China. Smugglers likely resorted to these attempts in the aftermath of the African Swine Flu, which seriously impacted domestic production, especially that of pork.

(5) We do see counts of smuggling in other areas from time to time between Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. However

this tends to be overland, or in inland rivers rather than the longer coastal routes so are not captured by the IFC.

(6) Recently we have seen an increase in drugs movement around Bangladesh, Myanmar, and northern Thailand. Some articles cited increased activity in Methamphetamine manufacturing in Myanmar and sea routes using fishing vessels to move drugs mirror the tactics of using fishing vessels further south around Indonesia.

6. Contraband Smuggling Categories. The categories of Contraband Smuggling are shown in **Figure 31**. In line with the general trend observed in the past, Drugs, Tobacco and Domestic Products have continued to be the three biggest contributors. The types of drugs seized are shown in **Figure 32**.

7. Drugs Smuggling. Methamphetamine continues to be widely found in the region. In Mar 20, Sri Lanka seized 605kg of meth and 579kg of ketamine (The first instance of seizure of Ketamine in Sri Lanka) from a flagless vessel in the high seas, two foreign trawlers with 400kg of Heroin and 100kg of Meth and 99.5kg of Heroin, disguised as potatoes in a container from Pakistan. In Mar 2020, 319.6kg of Ice was found at sea off Trat province, Thailand. In Jun 2020, Indonesia seized over 400kg of meth, said to have transported from the Middle East via a trawler. Over 850 packets were recovered at sea/ashore by India in Jul 20. Multiple incidents of apprehension of smugglers attempting to smuggle drugs from Malaysia to Indonesia via the sea route were also reported. Cannabis is also a major drug seized predominantly off Sri Lanka. Many packages recovered were ditched by smugglers, most likely to avoid apprehension.

a. Smuggling of Cocaine. The number of incidents of cocaine has dropped significantly as compared to 2019. The high number of cocaine incidents in 2019 was due to the large number of incidents of cocaine washing up ashore in Philippines. In May 2020, Hong Kong authorities seized 217 Kg cocaine hidden in an aircraft engine, in a container shipped from Ecuador.




Figure 33: Drug Categories

8. Fuel Smuggling. There has been continued heightened awareness of sanctions enforcement efforts relating to UNSC sanctions against North Korea. Incidents involving significant quantities of fuel smuggling were reported off Malaysia and Vietnam. The comparatively lower fuel prices in Malaysia make this a lucrative enterprise for smugglers. There have been multiple incidents reported of such vessels transferring fuel at sea; a practise that may aid IUU fishing. Small quantities of fuel smuggling from merchant vessels offshore were also reported in other places of IFC's AOI: this may be attributed to the rise of fuel prices in some of the countries.

9. Domestic Products Smuggling. The main occurrences of Domestic Products Smuggling involve necessities such as rice, cooking oil, flour, sugar, and vegetables, and is centred mainly around Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines where borders intersect, and maritime transport is the primary mode of transport. A spike was observed in the seizures of frozen meat in Hong Kong. The authorities have described criminal gangs that use barges and speed boats to smuggle items to mainland China. These barges were reported to be operating in areas near the construction site of Hong Kong airport. The shortage of meat caused by the African Swine Flu may have contributed to the increased demand. There was a single case in China where authorities seized 38,000 counterfeit goods being shipped from China to Turkey.

10. Wildlife Products Smuggling. The number of incidents reported saw a drop as compared to previous years, probably due to concerns over COVID-19. Many items are subject to high demand in China and goods are coming across the region from Africa or from Sri Lanka (in the case of proactive reporting on illegal Sea Cucumber harvesting), Malaysia. and Indonesia. Containers are the most common method of smuggling. Owing to the sheer number of containers moving through the region, varying rates of verification and the ability to transport goods without physical presence of smugglers. The use of fishing vessels/dhows has been observed to be more

common. Hong Kong customs seized approximately 34.5 tonnes of donkey pelts, sea cucumbers, and shark fins in containers, while two containers from Ecuador with 26 tonnes of shark fins were seized in another case in Hong Kong. In Southeast Asia, 3,274 Sea Turtle Eggs were seized from a speed boat in Indonesia. Malaysia Customs also seized 6,160 Kg of pangolins scales in a container and 4,000 kg of live crabs on two small boats. Pangolin is the most widely trafficked mammal and it has been reported that this ban was partly due to the concerns over COVID-19. Pangolin scales have been removed from an official 2020 listing of ingredients approved for use in traditional Chinese medicine, a positive move which will hopefully bring down the numbers, although the effect of the ban over the demand and illegal traffic can only be assessed in the near future.

11. Natural Resources Smuggling. The two main types of natural resources recorded are gold and wood. Gold predominately moves from Sri Lanka to India, owing to higher prices that can be fetched in India. Smuggled wood generally comes in two forms, the first being precious hardwoods and the other being wood for charcoal making. The precious hardwoods smuggled have cultural and religious significance and as such commands high value. The limited legitimate supply of hardwood (slow growing and protected in most cases) and higher prices drive the temptation for illegal logging and smuggling. The other form of wood harvested are for making illegal charcoal, a traditional cooking fuel. Generally, the wood are taken from mangroves, and such illegal deforestation has placed immense pressure on the already delicate ecosystems. Several such incidents were reported in South East Asian countries, such as Myanmar and Thailand. Of note, two incidents involved the seizure of red sandalwood being smuggled out of India.

12. Weapons Smuggling. There are very little reported weapons smuggling in the region. Historically, reported cases are linked to items such as detonators for blast fishing. Unfortunately, this lack of reports does not indicate the absence of weapons smuggling in the region. This may be due to undetected incidents or cases in which information has not been released due to operational reasons. The threats of transnational organised crime syndicates moving weapons to arm themselves or for selling to other criminals/violent extremists remains. There is also the potential for the smuggling of weapons along with violent extremist elements, in the wake of the dismantling of ISIS in Iraq and Syria as disbanded groups could look to take advantage of the porous maritime nature to move into South East Asia. There were no incidents reported in 2020, compared to one incident during the same period in 2019.

13. Tobacco Smuggling. While the title was amended to capture a wider range of tobacco products, more than just the smuggling of cigarettes, cigarettes remain the top tobacco product that have been smuggled by the carton and box. Apart from cigarettes, Beedi (Tobacco) leaves being smuggled in Sri Lanka was a major contributor in this category. The number of incidents involving Beedi leaves has dropped significantly compared to the same period the previous year. This may be attributable to enhanced law enforcement efforts and restrictions due to COVID-19.

SECTION E: IRREGULAR HUMAN MIGRATION (IHM)

1. Introduction. Between Jan to Jun 2020 the three main areas of IHM activities within the IFC AOI are as follows:

- a. Area I – Bangladesh Coast.
- b. Area II – Andaman Sea/Malacca Strait.
- c. Area III – Pengerang Coastal Area.




Figure 33: Locations of reported IHM incidents from Jan to Jun 2020

2. Definitions. These UN definitions are specialised terms used in this segment, and they are as follows:

- a. Human Smuggling. When persons are implicit and wilful in their irregular/illegal migration (based on economic; filial reasons; or migration associated with the UN definitions for Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Displaced persons and Stateless persons);
- b. Human Trafficking. When persons are coerced and moved/migrated against their will (forced or deceived into doing so);

c. Human Exploitation. When persons are used, or currently working in the maritime sector, as a resource with no regard for their well-being (within the maritime domain) e.g. Slavery. Migration may not be an element in this classification.

3. Key Observation(s). There were 42 IHM incidents reported between Jan to Jun 2020 within the IFC AOI. The numbers are lower than the first half of 2019 (58), but higher than 2018 (29). 34 of these cases were Human Smuggling, 5 cases were Human Trafficking, and 3 cases were Human Exploitation. In Apr 2020, the IFC recorded the largest number of IHM incidents (14).

a. The largest number of migrants are the Rohingya, totalling 1,836 migrants intercepted at sea, followed by Indonesian migrants (354), Filipino migrants (98), Vietnamese migrants (42), Myanmar migrants (33), Chinese migrants (18), Indian migrants (3) and Bangladeshi migrants (2). The nationalities of 6 migrants intercepted at sea remain unknown.

b. A range of factors continues to motivate people and smugglers to migrate, including political persecution, environmental factors, employment, and social factors. Most migrants are in pursuit of improved economic opportunities as they seek improved standards of living and employment due to insufficient job opportunities, improved living conditions including a stable and better future for their children in their own country or region.

c. COVID-19 has impacted living conditions, increasing the risks of widespread transmission, especially within the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. In these circumstances, human smuggling networks take advantage of the large number of migrants willing to take greater risks in search of a better life when there is an absence or inability to pursue legal channels of migration.

4. Factors Contributing to IHM. Several factors have contributed to the levels of IHM activities in the first half of 2020:

a. Law Enforcement. Multinational law enforcement agencies intercept IHM activities by gathering intelligence and sharing information with regional partners. Surveillance, security control, deployment of assets, and cross-border patrolling were all conducted to prevent encroachment of vessels into territorial waters.

b. Multilateral Cooperation. The Malacca Strait Patrols initiative continues to achieve effective operational responses to MARSEC challenges. Similar operations were also conducted between Malaysian, Philippines, and Indonesian authorities under the Trilateral Maritime Patrol.

c. COVID-19. The global pandemic and measures being taken by countries to control the spread of COVID-19 through more stringent border security measures are influencing human smuggling and human trafficking. While some of the preventive measures such as nationwide lockdown and travel restrictions have effectively inhibited certain criminal opportunities in the short-term, human

smugglers/traffickers and illegal migrants continue to find way to circumvent the law. The economic and employment consequences of COVID-19 have significantly increased migrants' desire and ability to move, as well as increasing the incentive and opportunities for human smuggling networks to profit from illegal migration.

d. Weather. Weather conditions have always influenced the ebb and flow of human migration in the region. Human smuggling networks continue to take advantage of good weather and forecasted bad weather conditions to convince vulnerable people to take greater risks. For instance, the Bay of Bengal is particularly prone to natural disasters and the impact of climate change, which affects islands and coastal and low-lying areas. These adverse weather conditions, such as those caused by monsoonal and cyclonic storm conditions forecast for the Bay of Bengal in May, most probably encouraged illegal migration in Apr 2020 even though they are risking their lives at sea and are beholden to the people smugglers.

e. Political Resolve. Issues related to statelessness and conflict are clear 'push' factors in influencing human migration. In many cases of conflict or political persecution, displacement and related migrant smuggling flows can be predicted before they occur. With displaced people, the will to identify and willingness to take action to find solutions is always difficult and takes time. Large numbers of displaced people will inevitably try to find a better situation for their families, which sometimes results in large numbers of people risking their lives by travelling via maritime routes. Criminal elements will also take advantage of these situations and convince, through lies and deceit, for desperate people to hand over their money. Governments and international organisations continue to address these situations within the IFC AOI.

5. IHM Modus Operandi. The Asia Pacific region has some of the world's largest migration corridors. Movement across the region has risen precipitously over the past few years. The most prominent routes in the first half of 2020 have been the south-easterly maritime routes from the Bay of Bengal towards West Malaysia and Indonesia. All these routes are used by human smugglers to lure people into seeking a better lifestyle or a new start in another country. The routes vary between coastal to the high seas. Some vessels know to loiter outside patrolled areas, waiting for indications from network organisers ashore when to ingress towards territorial waters. Human smuggling networks have a variety of roles, incorporating recruiters, transporters, facilitators, enforcers, organisers and financiers within their illicit networks.




Figure 35: Number of IHM Incidents by Month in 2018, 2019 and 2020




Figure 36: Numbers of Nationalities/Ethnicity of migrants

6. Key Observations

a. Bangladesh Coast. This is an area of interest as large numbers of Rohingya migrants have come from this area as they headed south-easterly towards the Andaman Sea/Malacca Straits.

b. Andaman Sea/Malacca Straits. The Andaman Sea/Northern Malacca region is the most common route employed by the Rohingya headed towards Malaysia or even loitering in this area for an opportunity to make landfall. Malaysia is regarded as an attractive location by migrants as it is a Muslim-majority state. In the past, Malaysia has also admitted migrants into the country based on humanitarian grounds. The southern part of the Malacca straits area remains an area of interest due to the influx of illegal migration, particularly by

Indonesian migrants. Many of the illegal movement apprehensions in this area was due to COVID-19 and increased border control such as Malaysia's Movement Control Order and cessation of legal transport options.

c. Pengerang's Coastal Area. Similarly, this area is associated with high numbers of human migration, due to economic/employment and religious reasons. During the COVID-19 pandemic, large numbers of Indonesian illegal migrants attempted to return to their homes for Ramadan and avoiding increasing Malaysian illegal migration operations.

d. Largest Movement. The largest numbers of people movement in this reporting period are associated with the Rohingyas. The pattern of migration is consistent with past trends recorded by IFC and the UNHCR's data. The vessels on which the Rohingya migrated in are usually overloaded and endure long periods at sea. Increasing numbers of unverified deaths and some instances of inappropriate behaviour from crew occur along the journey. However, these vessels continue to be intercepted by joint law enforcement operations with the aim of early detection. Accurate surveillance and reporting remain essential to further prevent further deaths at sea and any encroachment of vessels into territorial waters.

7. Conclusion

a. The observations presented with the movement of illegal migrants, particularly Rohingya migrants, within the IFC AOI indicates a significant increase in the volume of migrants compared to previous years (844 in 2019, 356 in 2018, 12 in 2017, 48 in 2016).

b. The Rohingya migration problem is an international issue that involves a small number of countries directly. Without an effective solution to this problem, the Rohingya will continue to risk their lives and be exploited by criminal organisations, and regional countries will continue to expend resources on increased surveillance and law enforcement operations. A broader regional political solution, not just those countries directly involved, would seem to be the best way to resolve increasing numbers of Rohingya migrations.

c. In the meantime, states will continue to address the complex dynamics of IHM by employing the necessary resources to manage and reinforce effective responses constructively. As such, law enforcement authorities will continue to assist in locating and apprehending illegal migrants and people involved in human smuggling and human trafficking and to enhance and improve interoperability between authorities with the exchange of data and information.

d. The IFC will continue to monitor movements of illegal migrants via the maritime domain and invites ship masters and operators to make optimal use of the tools and capabilities such as the Voluntary Community Reporting (VCR) program to promptly report any vessel(s) carrying large numbers of people onboard.

Note: Information herein were derived from various internal and external sources such as Focal Points, OPCENs and other maritime stakeholders. Seafarers should remain vigilant especially in areas where the threat level is assessed to be of concern in accordance with the IFC's Assessments via its Weekly Report or Spot Commentaries. Ships should apply the appropriate security measures (such as Tugs and Barge Guide, Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia, or Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia). Ship masters should also be aware and refer to the Maritime Security Charts Q6112 and Q6113, both published by the UK Hydrographic Office.



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